

AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

RESTRICTED
(Reclassify when
filled out)REPORT No. 10-60 17-44

XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA. (Narrative and comment. Describe action fully and comment freely, following applicable items in check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

ENGAGEMENT WITH ENEMY**OWN AIRCRAFT**

Disposition
Altitudes
Speeds
Approach Tactics
Use of Cover, Deception
Angles of Attack and
Their Effectiveness
Distance of Opening Fire
Defense Tactics and
Their Effectiveness

ENEMY AIRCRAFT

Method of Locating, Distance
Disposition
Altitudes
Speeds
Approach Tactics
Use of Cover, Deception
Angles of Attack
Distance of Opening Fire
Defensive Tactics

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Own Weaknesses
Enemy Weaknesses
Offensive Tactics, Own
" " , Enemy
Defensive Tactics, Own
" " , Enemy
Flexible Gunnery, Own
Escort Tactics
Fighter Direction
Use of Radar
Night Fighting
Recognition, Aircraft

ATTACK**OWN TACTICS**

Method of Locating Target
Approach to Target
Altitudes, Speeds
Approach
Dive
Pull-Out
Dive Angle
Strafing
Retirement
Defensive Tactics
Use of Jamming

DEFENSE, ENEMY

Evasive Tactics, Ships
Concealment
Searchlights
Night Fighter Tactics
Use of Jamming

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Bombing Tactics
Torpedo Tactics
Effectiveness of
Bombs, Torpedoes
Selection of Targets
Fuzing
Strafing Tactics
Defensive Tactics
Use of Radar
Reconnaissance
Photography
Briefing

OPERATIONAL

Navigation
Homing
Rendezvous
Recognition, Ships
Communications
Flight Operations
Search and Tracking
Base Operations
Maintenance

1. No enemy aircraft were seen in the air.

2. There was no AA fire observed.

XIII. MATERIAL DATA. (Comment freely on performance or suitability, following check-list at left.
Use additional sheets if necessary).**ARMAMENT**

Guns, Gunsights
Turrets
Ammunition
Bombs, Torpedoes
Bomb Sights
Bomb Releases

COMMUNICATIONS

Radio, Radar
Homing Devices
Visual Signals
Codes, Ciphers

RECOGNITION

IFF
Signals
Battle Lights
Procedures

PROTECTION

Armor, Points and Angles
of Fire Needing Further
Protection
Leak Proofing

EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Parachutes
Life Belts, Life Rafts
Safety Belts
Emergency Kits
Rations, First Aid

NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT

Compasses
Driftsights
Octants
Automatic Pilots
Charts
Field Lighting

INSTRUMENTS

Flight
Power Plant

OXYGEN SYSTEM**CAMOUFLAGE AND
DECEPTION DEVICES****STRUCTURE**

Airframe
Control Surfaces
Control System
Dive Flaps
Landing Gear
Heating System
Flight Characteristics
At Various Loadings

POWER PLANT

Engines
Engine Accessories
Propellers
Lubricating System
Starters
Exhaust Dampers

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM**ELECTRICAL SYSTEM**

Auxiliary Plant
Lights

FUEL SYSTEM**FLIGHT CLOTHING****MAINTENANCE****BASE FACILITIES**

Plane Servicing Equipment
Personnel Facilities

REPORT PREPARED BY:

APPROVED BY:

1. Soon after taking off and while joining up,,the pilot of
of one plane noticed that bomb on one of the other planes had
no tail fin and that the tail fuse was arming. The pilot of
this plane was notified and he jettisoned his bomb in the water.
On investigating the matter later, it was determined that this
situation may have happened by (1) improper installation of the
tail vane on the bomb and (2) the tail vane being hit by the
catapult bridle on take off. Apparently when the tail vane came
off the arming wire was carried away and the fuse armed itself
due to the fuse propeller being turned by the force of the wind.

2. All other aircraft on this mission operated in a normal
manner.

H.E. Richmond, LIEUT. USNR. AGIO. VI-60
SIGNATURE

RANK AND DUTY

H.O. Feilbach, Lt. Cdr. CAG-60
SIGNATURE

RANK AND DUTY

21 July, 1944
DATE

DATE

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VI. LOSS OR DAMAGE, COMBAT OR OPERATIONAL, OF OWN AIRCRAFT (of those listed in II only).

(a) TYPE OWN A/C	(b) SQUADRON	(c) CAUSE: TYPE ENEMY A/C, TYPE GUN, OR OPERATIONAL CAUSE	(d) WHERE HIT, ANGLE (List armor, self-sealing tanks, equipment hit)	(e) EXTENT OF LOSS OR DAMAGE, (Give Bureau serial number of planes destroyed)
1		N		
2		O		
3		N		
4		N		
5				
6				
7				
8				
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
14				

VII. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES (in aircraft listed in II only; identify with planes listed in VI by Nos. at left).

(a) NO.	(b) SQUADRON	(c) NAME, RANK OR RATING	(d) CAUSE	(e) CONDITION OR STATUS
		N		
		O		
		N		
		N		

VIII. RANGE, FUEL, AND AMMUNITION DATA FOR PLANES RETURNING

(a) TYPE A/C	(b) MILES OUT	(c) MILES RETURN	(d) AV. HOURS IN AIR	(e) AV. FUEL LOADED	(f) AV. FUEL CONSUMED	(g) TOTAL AMMUNITION EXPENDED				(h) NO. OF PLANES RETURNING
						.30	.50	20MM	MM	
<u>P62-3</u>	<u>XXXX</u>	<u>XXXX</u>	<u>4:10</u>	<u>350 GL.</u>	<u>200 GL.</u>					<u>4</u>
<u>TB4-1c</u>	<u>XXXX</u>	<u>XXXX</u>	<u>4:10</u>	<u>300 GL.</u>	<u>165 GL.</u>					<u>4</u>

IX. ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT ENCOUNTERED (Check one block on each line).

CALIBER	NONE	MEAGER	MODERATE	INTENSE
HEAVY — Time-fused shells, 75mm and over	<u>X</u>			
MEDIUM — Impact-fused shells, 20mm-50mm	<u>X</u>			
LIGHT — Machine gun bullets, 6.5mm-13.2mm	<u>X</u>			

X. COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE, OWN AND ENEMY AIRCRAFT (use check list at left).

SPEED, CLIMB,
at various altitudesTURNS
DIVES
CEILINGS
RANGE
PROTECTION
ARMAMENTNo enemy aircraft seen in the air.

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(OMIT THIS SHEET IF NO ATTACK WAS MADE)

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XI. ATTACK ON ENEMY SHIPS OR GROUND OBJECTIVES (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only)

Glide Bomb enemy troop concentrations along road, Area 565, and in Area 583, P.

(a) Target(s) and Location(s) Guam Is. Marianas Islands. (b) Time Over Target(s) 1710 -10 (Zone)
(FOR SHIPS INCLUDE ALL IN AREA UNDER ATTACK)

(c) Clouds Over Target 2500', Cumulus, 8/10.
(BASE IN FEET, TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER)

(d) Visibility of Target Target obscured by overcast. Squalls (e) Visibility 0-15 Miles.
(CLEAR, HAZY, PARTIALLY OBSCURED BY CLOUDS, ETC.) (MILES)

(f) Bombing Tactics: Type Glide Bomb Sight Used Gunsight
(LEVEL, GLIDE OR DIVE) (TYPE)

Bombs VT-1 VT-0
Dropped per Run TBM-12 Train 30' Altitude of Bomb Release VT-1800' av.
(NUMBER) (FEET) VT-500' av.
(FEET)

(g) Number of Enemy Aircraft Hit on Ground: Destroyed None. Probably Destroyed None. Damaged None.

(h) AIMING POINT	(i) DIMENSIONS OR TONNAGE	(j) NO. A/C ATTACKING (k) SQUADRON	(l) BOMBS AND AMMUNITION EXPENDED. EACH AIMING POINT	(m) NO. HITS On Aiming Point	(n) DAMAGE (None, slight, serious, destroyed or sunk)
1 <u>Along Road</u> <u>Area 565</u>		<u>4xP6F-3</u> <u>VF-60</u>	<u>4x500# G.P.</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>See Below</u>
2 <u>Enemy troops.</u> <u>583 P</u>		<u>4xTBM-1c</u> <u>VF-60</u>	<u>4x100# G.P.</u>	<u>47</u>	<u>See Below.</u>
3					
4					
5					
6					
7					
8					

(o) RESULTS: (For all hits claimed on ship targets and for land targets of special interest, draw diagram, top or side view or both, as appropriate, showing type and location of hits. For all targets give location and effect of hits, and identify by numbers above. Use additional sheets if necessary).

1. The fighters dropped their bombs along the road as assigned, but nothing was seen and no results were observed.

2. The VT pilots were told to pick out the area in which they believed the enemy troops to be concentrated and to bomb there. The leader of the mission dropped six of his bombs on the spot and the other three pilots dropped their bombs in the same area, using the first six bombs as reference. The VT leader then dropped his remaining six bombs. This area was well covered and the ground troops radioed that these VT pilots had achieved very good coverage.

(p) Were Photographs Taken? NO Photographs of Damage, When Taken, Should Be Attached By Staple.

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XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA.

1. There were no enemy aircraft seen in the air.
2. There was no enemy AA fire observed.
3. The 12 VF and 4 VT were sent to the target area together, as a strike group, with an approximate time limit of 3 hours before they must land. After circling for 1 3/4 hours, a bombing target was finally assigned 4 of the VF. No air coordinator was present to assist them in definitely locating the target. Twenty to thirty minutes was therefore spent in locating what was assumed to be the target but no direct hits were realized. The second group of 4 VF were then directed to attack the same target, a building, in 534 R. Time was then getting short and this group was hurried. However, they took about twenty minutes to locate what they assumed to be the target.

The fact that the bombs dropped by these two groups, supposedly on the same target, struck areas that were two to three miles apart, makes it evident that the target charts are too difficult to interpret, or that an air coordinator is essential.

By this time the group had overstayed its time limit, but 4 VF still had bombs to drop. Since the other two VF groups could not definitely locate the target after almost an hour, no attempt was made by the last 4 VF to locate it, so, rather than jettison the bombs, they were dropped along a road in a general area of enemy held ground. It is doubtful if even one of the twelve bombs did any good.

Meanwhile, but also comparatively late, the 4 VT were directed to work with front line troops. Although, they too were unnecessarily rushed, their bombing could be guided by ground forces and the results were satisfactory.

In view of the above sequence of events, which is not an isolated case, the following suggestions are submitted:

1. No more planes than can be profitably used, should be ordered to the target area. In general, send fewer planes oftener, if large numbers are required. It is very probable that half as many VF could have done more actual damage in this instance.
2. A flight leader should not be expected to also act as Air Coordinator, when more than two divisions of airplanes are in the flight.
3. An Air Coordinator, or observer, who has been on station long enough to thoroughly orientate himself, should be present to assist strike groups in locating pin point targets.
4. If no prominent target is evident, strike leaders should be assigned to a general area, as soon as they arrive, to spot actual enemy activity. This is more effective than standing by out of visibility range, and then attempting to hit a pin point target that

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XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA.

the Support Air Coordinator surmises is at a certain point on the chart. This especially holds true when there is no Air Coordinator.

5. The target grid charts require improvement in accuracy, clarity, and arrangement. The following suggestions are offered:

(a) The shoreline should be represented as the high tide line. The reef outline is not desirable except perhaps on the landing beaches. (See confusion caused in Guam Charts 5, 3, 3A, and reduced effectiveness of shore outline in Sheet 8.)

(b) Charts should have at least 1000 yards of overlap, so that no target can be on the very edge of a chart sheet. Most of the Guam sheets have sufficient water area for considerable overlap.

(c) Charts should be made on 1 or 2 uniform scales. Eliminate the 200 yard grid lines. Print the 1000 yard grid lines, and the letters in the same color, with the letter in the exact center of the 200 Yard square that it represents. Print grid numbers in a lighter type.

(d) Adjacent grids in the vertical columns should have numbers with the same numerical differences. For instance on Guam Chart 5 - target area 400 is 17 less than the area 417 adjacent. However, the area adjacent on the lower side of 400 is on Sheet 8 and cannot be determined without matching charts, a difficult procedure in flight. The area adjacent to 400 is 384 on Sheet 8 instead of 400-17 or 383. Differentials in round numbers such as 20 or 30 for vertical columns would be desirable, making adjacent vertical areas 383 - 403 - 423, etc.

(e) Chart sizes 10 or 11 inches square would not be too large to handle in flight.

(f) Gradient lines should be reduced to a minimum consistent with adequate interpretation. On a scale as small as Sheet 8, for instance, they are of little value. Perhaps gradient lines, with sufficient numerals, should be used for high points and cliffs, and river lines for low points (rivers and gulleys). Gradient lines on Chart 6 B are very confusing, and unnecessary, considering the other landmarks. Indications of the high points such as in 590 G, H, and 592 F, is desirable.

* The 4 VF and 4 VT from this ship were sent to the target area; together with 4 VF from each of the other two ships.

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Use additional sheets if necessary).

ARMAMENT

Guns, Gunsights
Turrets
Ammunition
Bombs, Torpedoes
Bomb Sights
Bomb Releases

COMMUNICATIONS

Radio, Radar
Homing Devices
Visual Signals
Codes, Ciphers

RECOGNITION

IFF
Signals
Battle Lights
Procedures

PROTECTION

Aarmor; Points and Angles
of Fire Needing Further
Protection
Leak Proofing

EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Parachutes
Life Belts, Life Rafts
Safety Belts
Emergency Kits
Rations, First Aid

NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT

Compasses
Driftsights
Octants
Automatic Pilots
Charts
Field Lighting

INSTRUMENTS

Flight
Power Plant

OXYGEN SYSTEM

CAMOUFLAGE AND DECEPTION DEVICES

STRUCTURE

Airframe
Control Surfaces
Control System
Dive Flaps
Landing Gear
Heating System
Flight Characteristics
At Various Loadings

POWER PLANT

Engines
Engine Accessories
Propellers
Lubricating System
Starters
Exhaust Dampers

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM

ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

Auxiliary Plant
Lights

FUEL SYSTEM

FLIGHT CLOTHING

MAINTENANCE

BASE FACILITIES

Plane Servicing Equipment
Personnel Facilities

REPORT PREPARED BY:

APPROVED BY:

1. All planes functioned in a normal manner with the exception that one bomb hung up in one THM. The bomb was later jettisoned over the water and when the mechanism was later inspected it all checked O.K.

H.E. Richmond, LIEUT. USNR, AGO, VT-60

SIGNATURE

RANK AND DUTY

H.O. Follbach, LT. Cdr. USNR, GAG-60

SIGNATURE

RANK AND DUTY

22 July, 1944.

DATE

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